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Abstract
The EU has established a new architecture of international labour standards governance within the
Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters of its Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). To
examine the operationalization of this framework, we draw upon 121 interviews undertaken with
key informants in three FTAs signed with the Caribbean, South Korea and Moldova. We engage
with wider debates over external governance and the projection of EU power by showing how
operational failings, including a lack of legal and political prioritization of TSD chapters and
shortcomings in the implementation of key provisions, have hindered the impact of the FTAs upon
labour standards. We also identify signiﬁcant limitations to the EU’s ‘common formulation’ ap-
proach when applied to different trading partner contexts, alongside ambiguities about the under-
lying purpose of the trade–labour linkage. Reﬂection about the function and purpose of labour
standards provisions in EU trade policy is therefore required.
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Introduction
The EU has long sought to address labour standards in its trade policy. This has been done
through references to labour rights in its unilateral Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) and by failed attempts to bring a social clause into multilateral trade agreements
(Wilkinson, 1999; Young, 2007). But it is in its free trade agreements (FTAs) where
the most notable changes are now occurring. FTAs are the most economically signiﬁcant
aspect of EU trade policy. They could cover as much as two thirds of EU trade if all
current negotiations are successfully concluded (EC, 2015a, p. 9). They are also the most
important legally binding instruments that the EU can use in its external policy (Jurje and
Lavenex, 2014). Labour provisions within EU FTAs have ‘widened and deepened’ over
the past decade. This is linked in part to the 2007 Lisbon Treaty which accorded greater
inﬂuence in trade policy-making to the European Parliament; an institution which has
emphasized the labour and human rights dimensions of trade policy (Van den Putte and
Orbie, 2015, p. 264).
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A signiﬁcant point of departure for labour provisions in EU FTAs was the 2008
CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). Unlike its predecessors, this
agreement contained more references to social policy norms and core labour standards.
It also allowed for disputes on social issues to be referred to independent experts, and
institutionalized dialogue about the trade agreement within a civil society mechanism
(CSM). Since the negotiation of the 2011 EU–Korea FTA such provisions have been
packaged with rules around environmental protection in a Trade and Sustainable
Development (TSD) chapter. TSD chapters have become an integral part of the EU’s
‘new generation’ trade agreements (Bendini, 2015). Such chapters were present in
ﬁnalized agreements with a further 18 countries as of July 2017,1 with bold claims made
about their efﬁcacy. TSD chapters are meant to ensure that economic growth goes hand in
hand with higher labour standards, making trade policy ‘not just about interests but also
about values’ (EC, 2015a, p. 5).
It is against this backdrop that we analyze the EU’s approach to protecting and
promoting labour standards. We do so by drawing on research into the negotiation and
implementation of labour provisions in three ‘new generation’ EU agreements, adding
to debates about the projection of EU power in three respects. First we argue that to
determine whether the EU’s approach to the external governance of labour can be charac-
terized as a form of (potentially signiﬁcant) ‘normative power’, qualitative analysis of
how FTA provisions are translated into practice is vital. Second, by empirically substan-
tiating the weaknesses of the EU’s common formulation approach across three cases, we
provide a critique of the intended functions of TSD chapters and argue for greater recog-
nition of the distinctive third country contexts that shape their operationalization. Finally,
we argue that different ideas among policy-makers and interest group representatives
about whom and what the trade–labour linkage is for, suggests the need for greater reﬂec-
tion upon the intended purpose(s) of labour provisions.
I. Existing Academic Debates on Labour Standards in EU FTAs
While there is some variation across the different agreements, the TSD chapters common
to EU FTAs share three key types of provisions. First there are substantive standards. All
agreements require that the parties commit to upholding the International Labour
Organization’s (ILO) core labour standards and promote its decent work agenda. Second,
there are procedural commitments. These include dialogue and co-operation between the
parties, transparency in introducing new labour standards measures, monitoring and
review of the sustainability impacts of the agreement, and a commitment to upholding
levels of domestic labour protection. Third, there are institutional mechanisms. All
agreements since the EU–Korea FTA have a tripartite format. Committees of state/EU
ofﬁcials from the two parties are established to oversee the implementation of the TSD
chapter. These are advised by a CSM that takes the form of a Domestic Advisory Group
(DAG) including representatives of business, trade unions, non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and occasionally academia, with the DAGs of the two parties meeting
together on an annual basis.2 Finally, there is an expert panel that investigates complaints
1 The agreements are with Canada, Colombia/Peru, Central America, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and the Southern African
Development Community.
2 The remit of the CSM in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA covers the whole of the agreement.
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made by the parties and makes recommendations on them. The implication of the
agreement text is that these institutions will interact to effectively implement the
TSD chapter.
In contrast to much of the literature on the EU’s trade–labour linkage, which concerns
itself with internal policy formation and the question of why labour standards provisions
have been addressed by the European Commission (see, for example, Bossuyt, 2009;
Lechner, 2016), we focus on external dynamics. Two inter-related debates are central:
(1) the form of external governance which the ‘EU model’ represents and seeks to project
beyond its borders; and (2) the effects of that model in the EU’s trading partners.
In the ﬁrst debate, two positions can be identiﬁed. One sees the EU’s labour provisions
as a weak form of ‘market power’ (Damro, 2012). Such claims are based on the ‘best
endeavour’ language of many of the provisions and the use of ‘soft law’ enforcement
to back them up, delinked from economic sanctions (Adriaensen and González-Garibay,
2013; Bartels, 2015; Vogt, 2015; Young, 2015) Moreover, since the reference points are
the internationally-agreed core labour standards of the ILO this is not seen as an
externalization of EU regulation per se (see Damro, 2012; Young, 2015).
Another position takes issue with this characterization of the EU’s approach,
suggesting that it does not give sufﬁcient weight to the communicative or ‘network-
based’ forms of governance through which standards are promoted and which give it a
European dimension distinct from the supposed ‘sanctions-based’ approach of the US.
From this perspective, the potential for improvements in labour standards is said to reside
in the mechanisms of dialogue and co-operation institutionalized through EU trade
agreements (Oehri, 2015; Postnikov and Bastiaens, 2014; Van den Putte and Orbie,
2015). Rather than evaluating the model’s effectiveness by looking solely at the legal
obligations placed on third countries towards immediate regulatory convergence, this
position allows for the possibility that improvements in labour standards may emerge
through longer-term change in political norms and processes resultant from learning
and socialization. TSD chapters can in this sense be understood as an exemplar of ‘nor-
mative power Europe’ wherein ‘persuasion, argumentation and the conferral of shame
and prestige’ rather than ‘coercion or solely material motivations’ effect more sustained
change in third countries (Manners, 2009, p. 793).
Informed by this debate on how the EU governs labour standards is a second set of
claims about what its effects have been. Postnikov and Bastiaens (2014, p. 931) offer a
mixed methods study of EU bilateral trade agreements in force prior to 2010, concluding
that those ‘with labour provisions have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on
workers’ rights in signatory nations’. Regression analysis is used to demonstrate the
impact, while interviews in Brussels and with one informant in Chile are used to buttress
the claim that what causes this positive effect is the way state ofﬁcials are educated about,
and normalized into, upholding labour standards. Also based on interviews in Brussels,
Garcia and Masselot (2015) argue that the EU’s insistence on the importance of core
labour standards during its FTA negotiations with Malaysia during 2010–12 created the
opportunity for the country to ratify the ILO conventions on freedom of association and
discrimination.
Other assessments cast doubt on such conclusions. Under the EU–Peru FTA Orbie and
Van den Putte (2016, p. 19) found that in Peru there were ‘serious shortcomings’ in the
implementation of core labour standards and that standards of labour protection on health
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and safety at work had actually been lowered since the agreement came into force. Like-
wise Marx et al. (2016, p. 606) found that, with regard to the TSD chapter in the
EU–Colombia FTA, there was a ‘shared notion among stakeholders that the EU’s
approach constitutes little more than “window dressing”’. Other studies have challenged
the EU’s purported mechanisms of inﬂuence. They ﬁnd that labour standards provisions
have not been accompanied by increases in development assistance for labour-related
activities (Ebert, 2016), that the functioning of the CSM in the EU–South Korea FTA
has been impaired (Van den Putte, 2015), and that in negotiations with Vietnam the EU
watered-down its requirement for the country to ratify the ILO convention on freedom
of association (Sicurelli, 2015). Collectively these critical evaluations pose questions
about the causal impact and lasting inﬂuence of the EU model of labour provisions.
Indeed, in response to similar concerns raised by actors within the EU – including
Members of the European Parliament and trade unions – in July 2017 the European
Commission acknowledged that some reform to the model might be necessary, initiating
‘a thorough stocktaking of the EU TSD provisions’ (EC, 2017c, p. 5).
These debates on labour provisions in EU FTAs resonate with the wider EU studies
literature about external inﬂuence and the conditions under which ‘rules travel’ (Lavenex,
2014). Three insights are particularly useful. First is the functionalist argument by
Lavenex (2014) that even when looking at ‘coercive’ rules affecting access to the EU
market such as regulatory standards, close attention must still be paid to the trans-
governmental and technocratic networks through which regulatory convergence is
enacted. Second is the recognition by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009, p. 804) that
third-country actors are more likely to accept modes of external governance that resonate
with their domestic institutional mechanisms and are seen as normal and legitimate. And
third is the point by Bicchi (2006, p. 293) that this is unlikely to take place when the EU
bases its external policy on routine behaviour and ‘exports its own norms unreﬂexively,
with a single model promoted to all its partners regardless of their context’ – an ‘our size
ﬁts all’ approach. Countering the more uniform and uni-directional ‘diffusionist’
approaches to external governance (see Börzel and Risse, 2012) these insights suggest
the need to interrogate the ways in which the EU’s TSD chapters articulate with different
third country contexts, via the networks intended to enact the processes of dialogue and
co-operation on labour standards (Campling et al., 2016). Our methodology for interro-
gating this phenomenon is outlined next.
II. Methodology
While existing research on the impact of EU labour provisions has relied on single case
studies and/or interviews with Brussels-based actors to generate data on causal
mechanisms of inﬂuence, our approach examines three cases, selected both because of
their diversity and because they reﬂect the most likely cases for labour provisions to have
an impact. These cases are the CARIFORUM EPA (2008), a trade agreement with a
stated development dimension, partnering the EU with 15 small Caribbean states; the
EU–South Korea FTA (2011), a bilateral trade agreement with a country that is geograph-
ically remote from the EU and at a comparable level of development on a per capita
income basis; and the EU–Moldova ‘deep and comprehensive trade area’ agreement
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(DCFTA), part of an Association Agreement (2014) with a small eastern European
country on the EU’s border.
In terms of most likely cases, the CARIFORUM agreement is the oldest of the ‘new
generation’ FTAs and thus gives the best chance for longer-term change to become
evident. This is important since ‘network-effects’ can take time to emerge; a point often
made by the European Commission regarding the perceived lack of impact of the TSD
chapters to date (DG TRADE, 2017). The EU–Korea FTA has been the agreement in
which the European Commission has invested most energy on TSD issues, and has been
touted accordingly as the success story with respect to dialogue. Meetings between the
two parties purportedly demonstrate that ‘the provisions are having a positive impact to
promote sustainable development’ (EC, 2015b). Finally, Moldova is geographically
proximate to the EU and is dependent on trade with the EU. In 2016 the EU accounted
for 49 per cent of Moldova’s imports and 66 per cent of its exports; more than any other
‘new generation’ FTA signatory (EC, 2017a).3 This material inﬂuence, of the sort rou-
tinely cited in the literature on the EU as external power, makes the Moldova agreement
the one in which the EU has the most political leverage. If the TSD chapters do not appear
to be affecting labour standards in these most likely cases, then it is unlikely that that they
will have signiﬁcant inﬂuence in other countries either.
The diversity of cases, meanwhile, allows us to reﬂect on the way in which third
country context matters to the operationalization of the EU’s consistent approach. In
particular, where similar conclusions are reached about the functioning of labour provi-
sions despite such diversity, the generalizability of ﬁndings concerning any inherent
limitations is strengthened. Put another way, lack of variation in the selection of case
studies can ‘inhibit the discovery and development of theories, models and concepts that
are broadly applicable’ (Vaughan, 1992, p. 174). By comparing accounts across the three
cases, we can also begin to explore how and why the domestic structures of third
countries matter to the EU’s attempts to govern labour standards.
The following analysis has a primary focus on the institutionalized practices of
dialogue and co-operation which are meant to ﬂow from the implementation phase of
the TSD chapter, and where there is most debate regarding the potential for impact on
labour standards. That said, in line with our ‘most likely’ case selection, we also take into
account the negotiating phase of FTAs. Research on the trade–labour linkage has
identiﬁed that during the negotiating period pressure upon trading partner governments
can lead to increased support for, and positive changes in, labour rights; a point reﬂected
by a number of EU representatives in our interviews (see also ILO, 2013).
We conducted interviews with an extensive range of key informants: those involved in
the negotiation and implementation of agreements in the case study countries as well as in
the EU (such as civil servants, politicians and spokespeople of prominent interest groups);
members of the institutional mechanisms set up through the agreements (the joint
committees, expert panels and CSMs); and knowledgeable ‘outsiders’ from business,
civil society and trade unions who ought to be affected by the respective provisions, thus
testing the reach of the TSD chapter beyond its immediate constituents. In 2015 and 2016,
3 Of the other European neighbourhood countries with recent Association Agreements, Georgia and Ukraine are both less
reliant on trade with the EU. The Ukraine Association Agreement is also very recent, making it difﬁcult at this stage to iden-
tify impacts of TSD chapter commitments.
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121 key informants were interviewed; around 30 in each case study and in Brussels.4 To
protect their identity, interviewees are referenced anonymously according to an
alphanumeric system (K23, E12 for example). The letter represents the location of the
interview – C for Caribbean, K for South Korea, M for Moldova, E for EU – and the
number a unique interviewee. In order to minimize the dangers of interviewee bias
affecting key conclusions, interviews were triangulated across multiple interviewee types
and/or by verifying with documentary evidence. Any signiﬁcant differences in opinions
between key informants are explicitly identiﬁed.
The methodology adopted here is important in that it seeks to isolate the impact of
labour provisions within FTAs from other factors, thereby interrogating the causal
relationship between particular policy instruments and changes in third countries. In many
existing studies on human and labour rights provisions in trade agreements, including
those contained in the EU GSP and in US trade agreements (see, for example,
Hafner-Burton, 2005; Kim, 2012), it is commonplace to assess the change over time of
the ‘average’ civil/labour rights situation of entire countries, typically via quantiﬁed
interpretations of reported rights violations aggregated from a limited range of textual
reports. Pinpointing and substantiating the precise mechanisms at work is beyond the
scope of that form of analysis. Such methods also miss the fact that, insofar as they are
operationalized at all, labour provisions tend to privilege certain actors by virtue of the
issues prioritized and the groups that mobilize around them, for instance focusing on
freedom of association more than poverty wages, and involving trade unions rather than
informal worker networks. By speaking with informants cognizant of these differences
and involved in the negotiation and implementation of the TSD chapters, our approach
allows us to investigate their contrasting understandings of what the trade–labour linkage
is for, and who it is intended to beneﬁt.
III. The Negotiation and Implementation of Labour Provisions
Negotiation
In all three cases there was a consensus among state representatives from the EU’s
negotiating partners, as well as others involved in the negotiations, that the TSD chapters
and labour provisions contained within them were proposed and driven through by EU
negotiators (C9, C19, C31, K23, K26, M16). Labour provisions were not seen as a natural
part of trade agreements by CARIFORUM, Korean and Moldovan negotiators (C9, C19,
K25, M16). Caribbean negotiators sought to safeguard against the provisions having sig-
niﬁcant impacts by clarifying that they could not become the basis for sanctions (C30,
C31), while Korean negotiators successfully demanded fewer references to international
standards and the removal of any immediate obligation to ratify all fundamental ILO con-
ventions (K25). Moldovan negotiators did accept the TSD chapter as it was suggested by
the EU on the basis that a similar formulation had been used in the Korean FTA and be-
cause the substantive standards were already part of Moldovan law as similar provisions
had been included in earlier GSP+ and Autonomous Trade Preference agreements with
the EU (M2, Smith et al., 2017, 2018). On the EU side, it was clear that TSD chapters
4 This was part of the ﬁrst stage of the project which was followed by a further round of sectoral and value chain interviews
in key export sectors in each case study; see, for example, Smith et al. (2018).
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were included primarily as a result of pressure from the European Parliament, supported
by NGOs and the European trade union movement (E7, E17). Negotiators from the Euro-
pean Commission saw their role as a relatively narrow one; to obtain agreement from
trade partners to the TSD chapters, rather than to create any detailed understanding of
them amongst states and civil society in trade partner countries (E9, E12).
At the same time, organized labour and their advocates in partner countries were not
able to open up space for discussion of labour issues in a meaningful way during the
negotiation period. These groups had a low level of engagement with the negotiating
process for two primary reasons. Some trade union interviewees stressed that they were
either opposed to the agreement as a whole or did not see it as a political priority in
comparison to pressing domestic issues, and so did not meaningfully engage with the
negotiations (C7, C9, K5, K23). Others argued that trade negotiators and government
ofﬁcials did not consult with trade unions or NGOs on the substance of the TSD chapters
(M2, M13, K23, C20). While it is possible for organizations in third countries to
participate in DG TRADE Civil Society Dialogue events and inform policy from the
EU side, no organizations from the three cases joined the ofﬁcial register (see EC,
2017b). Some consultation with organized labour was undertaken by the private sector
contractors which carried out the respective Sustainability Impact Assessments on
behalf of the EU. But, at best, it is unclear how such input fed into the ﬁnal recommen-
dations; at worst, it was merely teleguided participation designed to pay lip service to
non-commercial interests (on the CARIFORUM assessment see Gammage, 2010). We
now move on to discuss implementation of the labour provisions by the tripartite institu-
tional structure of the TSD chapter.
Committees of State/EU Ofﬁcials
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the negotiating process, civil servants based in the three
case studies thought that labour standards were not a legislative or procedural priority
in terms of the operationalization of the agreement (C4, C5, M2, K24). Rather, the
primary focus was on implementing the commercial provisions and setting up institu-
tional mechanisms. It was clear therefore, that improvements to the legal protection and
effective implementation of labour standards were not going to happen simply as a result
of the trade agreements coming into force. Of critical importance then, are the workings
of the institutional mechanisms that the TSD chapters create: committees of state/EU
ofﬁcials, CSMs and expert panels.
In terms of dialogue between state ofﬁcials in the EU and its trade partners, labour
standards had not been discussed in any detail by the Trade and Development Committee
in the CARIFORUM EPA (E8; see also CARICOM Secretariat, 2012). In the Korea FTA,
by contrast, EU interviewees argued that labour standards are increasingly on the agenda,
with South Korea’s failure to ratify four of the eight ILO fundamental conventions the
most important issue raised (E10, K24). But there was consensus among Korean
interviewees that the EU was unlikely to make any progress on those fundamental
conventions through the provisions and institutions of the FTA (K5, K10, K11, K25,
K27, K28, K31). Multiple interviewees in Korea pointed to the fact that President Park
Geun-hye’s administration (2013–17) had been actively pursuing a legislative programme
which involved signiﬁcant weakening of labour law (K5, K11, K18, K20, K22, K23,
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K31).5 For some connected to the labour movement, the move by the Park regime
indicated that any form of dialogue on increasing labour protection would be futile
(K23). In addition, state and labour representatives pointed to the fact that politicians
and civil servants vital to the process of labour law reform were not engaged in TSD
chapter-related discussions with EU interlocutors (K1, K16, K25). Finally, in Moldova,
while the ﬁrst meeting of the TSD Committee did discuss child labour and the labour in-
spection system, the primary focus, driven by pressure from civil society, was on the need
to resolve the deepening political and economic crisis that the country has been facing in
the wake of a 2014 banking crisis, which saw $1 billion allegedly stolen from the banking
system (M11, M12, M13, M14).
There was also little EU funding targeted towards TSD chapter-related activities,
reinforcing the ﬁndings of existing research (Ebert, 2016; Orbie and Van den Putte,
2016). We found only one relevant EU-funded project which was operational by 2016;
a €2 million project led by the ILO aimed at promoting regional social dialogue around
the obligations of the CARIFORUM agreement. Thus far, this had not led to any labour
standards issue being raised in the agreement’s committees (C12, C20, E8) and various
interviewees suggested that Caribbean trade unions are a long way from being able to
identify labour issues stemming from the EPA and formulate appropriate policies to
address them (C20, C21, C27). In 2016 two labour projects were being developed in
relation to the EU–Korea FTA. The ﬁrst focused on the implementation of ILO
Convention 111 on discrimination, the second on approaches to corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) in the EU and East Asia. While EU representatives saw these as stepping
stones towards dealing with more contested labour issues in Korea (E10), Korean labour
representatives were less convinced about whether they were strategic priorities in the
context of much more politicized issues, such as freedom of association (K23).
A compounding factor limiting progress was that state ofﬁcials in the EU and partner
countries did not see the TSD chapters as their primary responsibility, but rather saw
CSMs as being the primary mechanism for providing impetus on labour-related issues
(C5, E8, M7). As one Moldovan ofﬁcial said of labour provisions: ‘They are not exactly
commitments for government, they are more for civil society’ (M3).
Civil Society Mechanisms
As noted above, at the heart of the operation of the TSD framework and its potential
‘network-effects’ are mechanisms for civil society dialogue. It is clear that there have
been serious difﬁculties affecting the functioning of the CSMs in all three agreements.
In the Caribbean, there was a six year delay from the commencement of the agreement
to the operationalization of the CSM. Interviewees suggested that the long delay resulted
from government ofﬁcials’ unfamiliarity with, or even hostility to, incorporation of civil
society within the formal structures of a trade agreement. This was combined with the
difﬁculty of constituting a manageable and representative body from 15 different
Caribbean states incorporating historically distinct Anglophone, Hispanaphone and
5 The new administration of Moon Jae-in appears more open to engaging around freedom of association and forced labour
issues. This happenstance does not undermine our analysis here and later in the paper which demonstrates the problems and
limitations of the EU’s approach when dealing with an intransigent administration
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Francophone communities (C20, C31). The ﬁrst CSM meeting therefore only took place
in 2014, with further meetings in 2016 and 2017. A number of members suggested that,
particularly on the Caribbean side, the CSM had been insufﬁciently resourced to perform
its role (C12, E3, E25; see also Van den Putte, 2015). There is only one trade union
representative on the CSM, the low-proﬁle Caribbean Congress of Labour. Other
members of the CSM on the Caribbean side had no knowledge of the content of labour
provisions and therefore seemed unlikely to engage with them (C20). At the time of
writing, labour standards issues have not been raised in any Caribbean, European or joint
civil society meetings (C20, E6, E8), nor were they mentioned in the response of the
parties after the agreement’s ﬁve year review (CARIFORUM-EU, 2015). Overall, while
a few interviewees claimed that the CSM has a useful knowledge-sharing function, most
felt that there was no real purpose to their discussions, beyond demonstrating that the
meetings themselves have taken place (C12, C13, C20, E6). As one informant close to
the implementation process cautioned: ‘At the moment we risk becoming another one
of these institutions where you meet twice a year, and you put out a statement “Committee
met in Brussels and raised concerns about this and that” and that is the end of it’ (C20).
The Korean CSM was seen by interviewees from the European Parliament, the
Commission and trade unions as the most advanced and developed of all CSMs, reﬂecting
the importance placed on this ‘ﬂagship’ agreement by the EU (E10, E16, E26). Funding
was less of an issue and meetings occurred more regularly and predictably. Some EU
ofﬁcials and business groups were positive about the fact that dialogue is occurring
(E14, E20, E21), but questions remained from representatives of both sides about what
the mechanism is achieving and whether the discussions are valuable (E19, E26, K16,
K23). As in the Caribbean case, European and Korean trade unions said that the CSM
was unnecessary for creating international links as there were existing networks (E30,
E31, K5, K11, K21, K22, K23). A number of Korean interviewees involved in the
CSM also raised concern about the lack of meaningful engagement from EU interlocutors
in the civil society forum (K16, K17, 26). Additionally, as in the CARIFORUM EPA,
meetings have been treated as an end in themselves (K17). On the European side there
was on-going scepticism from trade union and civil society representatives, as well as
from Members of the European Parliament, about ‘public interest’ membership of the
Korean Domestic Advisory Group (academics and other professional researchers), and
the extent to which it is sufﬁciently independent from government (E6, E17, E30), along
with a more prosaic recognition that linguistic differences make communication and
relationship building difﬁcult (E6).
In Moldova, implementation of the agreement is at an earlier stage. But there were
already serious funding and institutional capacity problems, with complaints about lack
of support for even the most basic structures of the CSM on the Moldovan side (M11),
noted also in the joint declaration following the second meeting between the EU and
Moldovan DAGs in October 2016. Members of the CSM reported little attention being
paid to labour standards (M8, M11). This was reﬂected in the joint declaration of the
Moldova and EU Domestic Advisory Groups (2015), which identiﬁed very general labour
issues to address (such as ‘adoption and strengthening of the domestic enforcement of the
ILO conventions’) and placed these alongside other priorities such as forming a functional
government and easing lending to businesses. Partly this was a result of the wider crisis
affecting Moldova which dominated political discussions generally, and partly because
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members of the Moldovan CSM also met to discuss a range of issues in committees con-
stituted by other parts of the wider Association Agreement. There are a limited number of
non-state actors in Moldova with a capacity to engage, and so the same organizations play
multiple roles. Consequently, there was considerable confusion as to the proper remit of
this CSM as distinct from other civil society fora (M7, M11).
Interactions between the Committee, CSM and Panel of Experts
Compounding the limitations of the civil society dialogue process, civil society represen-
tatives and state ofﬁcials were unsure about how the inter-governmental TSD Committees
were supposed to respond to issues identiﬁed by the CSMs (C12, E8, M11). This raises a
broader issue of the interactions between the different institutional mechanisms
established by the agreements. A number of civil society and trade union representatives
thought that the opinions of the CSMs were not taken seriously by the European Commis-
sion or inter-governmental committees, and that interactions between them were superﬁ-
cial (C20, E6, E23, E30, K6). The only examples we found of meaningful interaction on
labour-related issues occurred in relation to the EU–Korea FTA. The ﬁrst issue concerned
the exclusion of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions from the CSM, and was suc-
cessfully resolved with EU DAG pressure. But a second issue, described below, exposed
more fundamental concerns about the TSD chapters and their potential to protect and pro-
mote labour standards.
After European and Korean trade unions had raised issues in joint CSMmeetings about
the Korean government’s failure to make progress on ratifying ILO fundamental conven-
tions, the EU DAG sent a letter to the Commission requesting that formal consultations be
initiated – a precursor to convening the panel of experts – on the basis that widespread
violations of labour rights, particularly freedom of association, were allegedly taking place
(Jenkins, 2014). But the Trade Commissioner at the time, Karel De Gucht, rejected the
request and instead promised to pursue the matter through intergovernmental dialogue
(Vogt, 2015). Trade union and NGO representatives in Europe, however, remained
sceptical that intergovernmental dialogue, even against a background of CSM pressure,
would produce tangible results (E15, E19, E26, E29). One trade union actor argued that
the presence of trade unions within the CSM was utilized to legitimize the agreement,
without leading to any substantial change for labour rights protection on the ground (E26).
European Commission ofﬁcials stressed that the labour situation is difﬁcult in South
Korea and that the TSD chapter cannot undermine the overall objectives of the agreement
(E10, K24). Providing empirical support for Orbie’s (2009) contention that the social
dimensions of trade are potentially compromised by commitments to market opening,
one Commission ofﬁcial told us that:
‘It is important to have a positive forward looking agenda. Confrontation would lead to a
backlash on behalf of Korea. We want to add investment protection into the agreement. If
we took action under this chapter, we might lose beneﬁts elsewhere. So we do need to
think about the bigger context’ (E14).
This reluctance to commence formal ‘complaint’ procedures in Korea is symptomatic
of a broader sense that there is inadequate legal duty and political will to at least try and
enforce labour standards provisions. There have been no complaints taken to the expert
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panel in any EU FTA, putting a question mark over the efﬁcacy of this institutional
mechanism. Perhaps conﬁrming this suspicion, members of expert panels in trading
partners did not appear to have been well-briefed about the role they had taken on. Inter-
views with panel appointees revealed that some did not have a basic understanding of the
types of functions they might be expected to perform and others did not know they had
even been appointed.
Overall then, labour standards provisions were being undermined by lack of prioritiza-
tion among key actors and shortcomings in implementation. Government ofﬁcials from
trading partners did not appear to see the externally imposed TSD chapters as their
responsibility, and despite general commitment to the sustainable development agenda
by DG TRADE (see EC, 2015a) ofﬁcials were not deeply engaged with labour rights
issues in third countries, the motivation for which has its origins in the European
Parliament. The result is that the weight of expectations has been loaded onto CSMs.
But CSMs are ill-equipped to play a meaningful ‘networking’ role. Dialogue between
civil society actors has not been fruitful, and it is unclear how the outputs of that dialogue
would impact on state or business policy, given shortcomings in the engagement pro-
cesses with governmental bodies and the dispute settlement process.
IV. Common Framework, Different Limits
Our argument thus far is that the EU has arrived at a common approach to the governance
of labour standards in its FTAs that has failed to have substantive effects within three
most likely cases. Given the diversity of the cases selected, we can also suppose that
the context in which the EU model is deployed does not matter greatly to the outcome.
This raises a further question: could the TSD chapters be effective if they were better op-
erationalized, or are there inherent limits to what they can achieve? The evidence from our
three cases sides ﬁrmly with the latter.
In the Caribbean context, the vast majority of interviewees did not consider ILO core
labour standards, which are at the heart of the EU’s model, to be the most pressing prob-
lem and pointed to the near universal ratiﬁcation of the fundamental conventions in the
region as evidence of this (C2, C3, C9, C10, C11, C21, C28, C33). Similarly, European
trade unionists thought violations of core labour standards were much more systematic in
neighbouring Central America, meaning that support for Caribbean labour movements
was not a priority (E23, E25). This is not to say there are no rights violations or labour
disputes involving organized labour, but what many academic and NGO interviewees
were at pains to point out was that small-scale farmers, informal traders, the self-
employed and those working on daily contracts had been worst affected as a result of
the region’s changing trade relationships (C3, C17, C18, C26). For instance, it was
suggested to us that ‘hucksters’ – petty traders who are predominantly female and often
operate outside the formal economy – were being adversely affected by the tightening
up of customs operations, partly as a result of the CARIFORUM agreement’s trade facil-
itation provisions (C17). Consequently, for Caribbean civil society actors in the CSM, the
main focus was to try to understand what impacts the EPA was having on employment
and working conditions in the region, and it was for this reason that concerns were raised
over inadequate monitoring (C20). All TSD chapters contain an obligation to monitor the
social and environmental impacts of the agreements, but resources for the CSMs to carry
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this out are very limited (E14). Eight years after coming into force the ﬁrst efforts at
developing a methodological approach for monitoring the social impacts of the
CARIFORUM agreement were only just beginning (E8, E25).
A very different situation is apparent in South Korea, which has only signed and
ratiﬁed four out of the eight fundamental ILO conventions. During the ﬁrst ﬁve years
of the FTA, the Korean government stood accused of cracking down on trade unions in
a way that severely undermined freedom of association, attested to by complaints submit-
ted to the ILO in 2013 and 2015 by coalitions of domestic and international trade unions.
This was accompanied by conﬂict between government, trade unions and businesses
about proposed relaxation to existing labour laws. Insofar as they speak to prominent
concerns in Korea then, the standards and procedures contained in the FTA provisions
are apt. However, trade union and business actors in Korea have called into question
the use of social dialogue to achieve these ends, not least because of the antagonistic
state-society relations that characterize labour governance, which is in turn linked to the
inﬂuential political role played by the family conglomerates known as chaebols (K3,
K5, K10, K30, K31). These problems are exacerbated by the fact that, in the eyes of
well-placed interviewees, the EU has insufﬁcient political inﬂuence over the Korean
government to induce policy change, further aggravated by the aforementioned reluctance
of the European Commission to take a strong stance on labour rights (E29, K25).
In Moldova, the government has signed and ratiﬁed all the fundamental conventions.
ILO reports and interviews indicate there are problems with regard to child labour,
especially in the agriculture sector, and with the labour inspectorate, which is covered
indirectly in the procedural commitments of the TSD chapter to uphold domestic labour
law (M1; see also ILO, 2016, Smith et al., 2017). But it proved difﬁcult to retain focus
on these labour issues when the political landscape was dominated by the profound
governance problems mentioned above (M7) and when the predominant labour issues
in Moldova relate to poor wages and conditions of employment – aspects not captured
adequately in the ILO core labour standards framework. It may therefore be more produc-
tive to concentrate on the broader range of labour provisions contained in the Association
Agreement, since these include obligations to introduce legislation inﬂuencing the quality
and quantity of employment as part of the convergence of Moldovan legislation to meet
the requirements of the EU’s acquis communautaire. During the agreement’s negotiation,
these obligations were considered far more demanding and important than labour provi-
sions in the TSD chapter (M2, M3). Indeed, in 2015, Moldova passed laws to transpose
European Directives on ﬁxed-term work and on obligations to inform employees about
their conditions of work. Others including those pertaining to occupational health and
safety, remain outstanding (Moldovan government, n.d.). However, the institutions of
the TSD chapter are not designed to engage with issues outside the trade chapter of the
Association Agreement.
This examination of the ways in which labour provisions are utilized (or not) and the
elucidation of the concerns of key constituencies in our three case studies reveals the
differentiated limits of the common formulation adopted by the EU. What we ﬁnd is that
the appropriateness of the EU model is brought into question in terms of substance (for
instance, should the focus always be on ILO core labour standards?), process (for
instance, what are the possibilities and limitations of dialogue in the context of particular
political situations and relationships?), and scope (such as, should there be a focus on
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labour-related obligations beyond those contained in the TSD chapter?). At root, we
suggest that the failure to design labour provisions to better articulate with third-country
contexts has limited the possibilities for EU FTAs to protect and promote labour
standards. Coupled with the challenges facing the operationalization of TSD chapters as
identiﬁed earlier – presented summarily in Table 1 – we therefore conclude that a serious
reconsideration of the EU’s trade–labour linkage is required.
Conclusions
A superﬁcial account of labour provisions within EU FTAs tells a positive story. Trade
agreements have been negotiated with relatively extensive substantive standards and
Table 1: Summary of Research Findings on Labour Provisions in Three Case Studies
CARIFORUM South Korea Moldova
Agreement type Economic Partnership
Agreement (2008)
Free Trade Agreement
(2011)
Association Agreement
with Deep and
Comprehensive Free
Trade Area (2014)
Negotiation Driven by EU interests
and not challenged
by Caribbean
negotiators who
did not want to
jeopardize the
wider agreement
Driven by EU interests
but modiﬁed by Korean
government not wanting
to meet ILO fundamental
conventions on freedom
of association and forced
labour
Driven by EU interests
and not a site for serious
negotiation as main
elements of the ILO core
labour standards already
part of national regulatory
framework
Committee
of state/EU
ofﬁcials
No discernible
discussion of any
labour reforms
needed as a result
of the agreement
Contested labour politics
in South Korea but TSD
mechanisms not able
adequately to address the
issues
Primary focus on good
governance and banking
crisis, not labour
provisions
Civil society
mechanism
Lengthy delays in
establishing dialogue
mechanisms, limited
resourcing
Procedural activities well
developed but lack of
progress on substantive
labour issues
Little attention paid to
labour issues and limited
representation of organic
civil society in CSMs
Interactions
between the
committee, CSM
and panel of
experts on
labour issues
Hampered by lack of
monitoring of social
impacts of EPA; no
complaints initiated
and no use of
committee of experts
Some meaningful
interaction around
composition of the CSM
but no change to labour
standards governance
per se; no complaints
initiated and no use of
panel of experts
Limited given focus
on wider issues of
governance and political
crises; no complaints
initiated and no use of
panel of experts
Primary labour
issues
Trade-related
redundancy, informal
workers not protected
Highly politicized struggles
over labour rights, concerns
over freedom of association
and forced labour
Poverty pay, child labour
in agricultural sector,
erosion of capacity of
State Labour Inspectorate
as part of wider process
of labour market
liberalization
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procedural commitments. Representatives of the respective parties are meeting with their
international counterparts and civil society meetings are occurring. But in terms of
addressing substantive labour standards issues, this article has shown that TSD chapters
have delivered little. Scholars have already argued that the EU has not sought to ‘aggres-
sively’ export labour standards through its trade agreements (Young, 2015). We show that
neither have state ofﬁcials in trading partners readily imported them. Rather, they have
reluctantly accepted – or even actively softened – minimalist obligations around core
labour standards. The weight of expectation has been loaded instead onto processes of
dialogue, particularly via CSMs, widely considered as the key institutions for making
progress on labour issues. However, CSMs are seriously hampered by various operational
deﬁciencies as well as political marginalization within the broader institutional mecha-
nisms and processes of the FTA. Overall, we found no evidence that the existence of
TSD chapters has led to improvements in labour standards governance in any of our case
studies, nor did we ﬁnd any evidence that the institutionalization of opportunities for
learning and socialization between the parties was creating a signiﬁcant prospect of
longer-term change. These ﬁndings thus offer the most robust refutation to date of the
hypothesis that labour provisions in EU FTAs are actively advancing workers’ rights.
And in contrast to more optimistic assessments, they also suggest that future normative
inﬂuence is unlikely to be realized via TSD chapters in their current form.
Should the EU therefore seek to put more of its market power behind its labour
governance strategy? Such an approach could in part be realized by the most common
suggestion for reform from European interviewees involved in the labour movement,
namely to increase the enforceability of the TSD chapter by giving the EU the ability
to withdraw preferential access to its market if labour standards are violated (E17, E19,
E20, E25, E26). This would make the labour provisions more coercive, and in the shadow
of sanctions, perhaps persuade trading partners to engage in more earnest dialogue and
responsive action. Yet some interviewees in case study countries averred from this
approach, with unionists and allied researchers expressing concern about the dangers of
labour standards being utilized as a form of disguised protectionism (C7, K10). We agree,
then, with the comments made by one labour representative who noted that more must be
done to assuage such concerns and explain how speciﬁc forms of conditionality could
beneﬁt labour struggles in trade partners (E33). This demands consideration of a range
of complex design issues including how a dispute is initiated, who it targets in relation
to what labour-related allegations, who investigates those allegations, who decides on
the kinds of corrective action and penalties, and what form of sanctions or ﬁnes are
available to do this. Appropriately nuanced, a crude social clause founded on economic
nationalism could thus be avoided.
But tackling enforceability issues will not by itself attend to the deﬁciencies identiﬁed
above. In contrast to an ‘our size ﬁts all’ model, Bicchi has argued that the EU needs
instead to ‘critically analyse the expected consequences of norm promotion for all parties
involved and adapt … accordingly’ (2006, pp. 289–290). In the Caribbean context, this
could have been achieved by recognizing and responding to the aspirations of civil
society to monitor the impacts of the EPA on employment and working conditions. In
Korea, by developing alternative strategies for engaging key government ofﬁcials with
responsibilities for labour rights. And in Moldova, by giving the TSD chapter the remit
to address labour obligations contained in the wider Association Agreement, as this
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would begin to address issues like health and safety at work that go beyond the ILO’s core
labour standards. In the same way that the EU has addressed context-speciﬁc commercial
issues in a bespoke manner (such as in the annex to deal with non-tariff barriers in auto-
mobile parts under the Korea FTA), it ought to extend the same treatment to fundamental
labour rights by designing provisions that articulate with the most pressing labour issues
in each trade partner.
Stepping back from the question of efﬁcacy, our ﬁnal reﬂection is more scholarly in
orientation. It concerns the underlying purpose of labour provisions. In the academic
literature on the trade–labour linkage it is assumed that such provisions are intended to
raise ‘the national average’ of labour rights protection in third countries, however
measured and regardless of whether those jobs are connected to tradable goods and
services. Yet the analysis presented here reveals that the groups and individuals central
to the operationalization of the EU’s TSD chapters had very different understandings of
what they were meant to achieve – from monitoring trade impacts to reforming state
institutions like the labour inspectorate. Further diversifying that sense of purpose is the
notion that TSD chapters are ways of regulating global supply chains, as exempliﬁed
by the promotion of East Asian CSR in the Korea case and elaborated in the European
Union’s (2015) proposed text for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
and in speeches by the EU Trade Commissioner (Malmström, 2015).6 This explicitly
reorients labour provisions toward jobs in transnationally-organized export industries
and away from those within discreet national economies. Lastly, we note that at the
2017 civil society forum of the EU–Korea FTA some participants turned the discussion
toward inadequate protection of workers within the EU, complicating the assumption that
such provisions are essentially externally orientated. While such alternative trade–labour
linkages could create new possibilities for improving labour standards, they also demand
new methodologies to scrutinize them along the lines we have developed here, paying
more attention to causal mechanisms and intended beneﬁciaries.
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